WHY SIBERIA?
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SIBERIAN INTERVENTION,
1918-19
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, University of Waterloo
©April 1998
Appendix A continued from “The League of Nations provided a new multilateral forum for Canada to test her new, more independent international identity in the years ahead.”
Appendix A: Telegram, Chief of General Staff to War Office
TELEGRAM 7B Ottawa, January 8, 1919
Reference to your ciphers D.M.O. 73422 January 4 and 73489 January 6. Following message approved by Cabinet and sent by my Minister’s discretion. Begins. On account of representations made by British Government respecting necessity for Allied intervention in Siberia, Canadian Government has been anxious to co-operate as far as practicable.
So far Canadian Government has been unable to consent to Canadian troops moving inland from Vladivostock because it is understood first, that both Japanese and United States Governments are unwilling to allow their troops to move inland, and secondly, there appears to be no co-operation among the Allied and Associated Powers with respect to the policy to be pursued or the purposes to be served by the continued presence of their troops in Siberia.
If that view of the situation be correct, then Canadian Government adheres to opinion that insomuch as Canadian troops were sent to Vladivostock as part of an Allied Force and in pursuance of a definite understanding, they should not move inland now that uncertainty of purpose had appeared among Allied and Associated Powers.
Canadian Government further feels entitled to be explicitly informed, first, as to the present attitude of the American and Japanese Governments with regard to the continued presence of their troops in Siberia, and secondly, as to the object which the British Government now has in view in keeping British Forces there.
Present distribution of Canadian Siberian Force is in round numbers:
In Siberia 1100
At Sea 2700
In Canada 1200
Total 5000
Those at sea were not recalled by wireless. Those in Canada will stand fast and no decision will be reached regarding their demobilization until reply this cable is received. The despatch of stores will proceed.
Canadian Government cannot consent to any of our Forces going forward until we have explicit detailed information as to attitude of Allied and Associated Powers; but, if considered necessary, General Elmsley may proceed to Omsk when General Bickford, not at sea, reached Vladivostock.
Unless withdrawal of Canadian troops will embarrass British Government the Canadian Government feels, owing to uncertainty and indefiniteness of whole situation, that Canadian Forces should be returned to Canada. The Canadian Government is prepared, however, to let matters stand as they are now, provided there is any hope of a very early decision by the Allied and Associated Powers respecting the Siberian problem. Ends. Please cable reply.(54)
Continue reading CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SIBERIAN INTERVENTION, 1918-19 page 1, page 2, page 3, page 4, page 5, page 6, Appendix A, Appendix B, Bibliography
ENDNOTES
54. Department of External Affairs, Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 3 (1919-1925), 60-61.